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ABSTRACT: The problem of observations is one of the cornerstones of science. It connects with 
several ontological, epistemological and methodological questions. The nature of science 
depends on how we answer these questions. Modern science is at the stage of a new revision of 
its fundamental basis. In addition to science, the problems of the essence of observations and the 
status of an observer are actively discussed in modern philosophy. Such philosophical trends as 
speculative realism, etc., tend to resume the old discussion about the role of the observer in the 
study of natural phenomena. This is done based on modern scientific discoveries and theories. 
The solution to the problem of observation is important for the further development of quantum 
physics and other branches of natural science. However, there are several difficulties in achieving 
this goal. One of them is the inadequacy of the concepts of scientific language to describe the 
ontological specifics of observations. The concepts of a scientific language tend to reduce or to 
simplify a complex phenomenon to a monosemantic description. At the same time, there is an 
aspiration to connect the ontological nature of observations with the functioning of human 
senses. We study this situation with the example of one of the new articles devoted to the problem 
of the essence of observations and their role in the construction of a scientific model of the world. 
KEYWORDS: Observations; Ontological position of observer; Quantum physics; Speculative 
realism; Participatory anthropic principle; Quantum consciousness. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
The problem of observations is one of the oldest problems of philosophy and 
science. Lots of great philosophers and scientists from Plato and George Berkeley 
to Werner Heisenberg and Niels Bohr tried to solve it. This problem concerns 
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not only the question of the epistemological foundations of scientific activity but 
also the fundamental question of the ontological nature of the objects of reality. 
Drs. Vipul Arora and Laxmidhar Behera in the 14th Volume of Cosmos and History: 
The Journal of  Natural and Social Philosophy again raised the question of the 
ontological status of observations in the context of modern physics achievements 
in the cognition of nature (Arora & Behera, 2018). The previous attempt to solve 
this problem within the framework of science led to a serious revision of the 
fundamental concepts. Quantum physics faced with the inability to use the classic 
concepts and terms, which based on our everyday experience, for describing the 
phenomena of quantum reality. The solution of this problem was the creation of 
the mathematical apparatus, the semantic correlation of which with sensually 
perceived reality was not obvious. However, the constant revision of the scientific 
paradigm doesn't suit many scientists. Vipul Arora and Laxmidhar Behera try to 
create the conception of observations that will be resistant to the revision of 
scientific theories. In this paper, we analyze their new variant of the ontological 
view on the role of observer and observations. 
II. SENSES AND DETECTORS. 
Any concepts and definitions are the results of the abstracting, i.e. the mental 
activity of separating the nonessential properties of objects from their main 
properties. The nonessential properties may be ignored in the future cognition of 
the object according to the subject's goals. We need to do this because reality has 
an infinite variety of properties and qualities. The human intellection can't get to 
cognate all of them. Contrariwise an abstract concept, which is the result of 
abstracting, can be meant as a mathematical symbol that has unambiguous 
meaning. Unfortunately, the vast majority of our concepts come from sensual 
experience and depends on the features of human perception and thinking. This 
gives the reason for some philosophers to talk about the fundamental falsity of 
information coming to us from the senses. Moreover, there are some limitations 
in using an everyday language for the formation of scientific theories. Neo-
positivistic and analytical traditions in the philosophy of science are trying to 
solve this problem from the time they appeared to this day. However, there is an 
opinion that this problem is not fundamentally solvable and it is impossible to 
completely formalize the scientific language. This conclusion is also deduced 
from Gödel's incompleteness theorem. After its creation, several mathematical 
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and logical theories studied the features of formal systems including the 
formalized language of science. We can conclude that: 1) notions, which were 
abstracted from our senses, shouldn't be regarded as absolutely appropriate to the 
properties of reality; 2) all scientific theories are the models of reality which are 
influenced by features of human perception and thinking. Metaphorically we can 
say that we have to study the ‘Kantian things-in-themselves’ while being in the 
‘Platonic cave’, whereas our thinking is weighed down by ‘Baconian Idols of the 
mind’.  
Drs. Vipul Arora and Laxmidhar Behera wrote that they ‘present a notion of 
primary properties where the observer plays an important role’ (Arora & Behera, 
2018, p. 253). If one does not take into account the various variants of subjectivism 
and solipsism, this is a very bold statement in the philosophical sense. Their 
mathematical and epistemological models are very promising but also contain 
many difficulties. One of them is a kind of semantic reductionism. They used to 
apply words like a ‘sense’ and ‘detectors’ without specific content. Thereby the 
important problem of philosophy and science is avoided. We suppose that the 
concept of a detector is broader in its logical content than the concept of a sense 
organ. So, we can reason at least about the three types of detectors: 1) the sense 
organ (as an integral part of the organism, which has a nervous system); 2) the 
detector (as a technological system); 3) the ‘natural’ detector (as an integral part 
of the natural object, which has not a nervous system). In the latter case, we are 
talking about an open, non-equilibrium system that is capable of exchanging 
matter, energy and information with the environment. But in the context of this 
discussion, we are interested in the first two points. All types of detectors are 
influenced by a kind of prerequisites: the natural laws and scientific theories 
(which are correlated with the natural laws in turn). That is why the conversation 
about detectors, in general, should serve only as an introduction to the study of 
specific cases. It is necessary not only to affirm that certain concepts of physical 
quantities can be abstracted from concrete senses or indications of detectors. It is 
necessary to take into account the non-absolute status of detectors or sense organs 
relative to reality. In some form, this problem is posed by Drs. Vipul Arora and 
Laxmidhar Behera as a problem of primary and secondary qualities. But their 
proposition that the primary properties of reality can be abstract out from our 
senses or detector information can be questioned in turn. 
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Let us try to imagine the world, where all people are blind. Or, if we want to 
use scientific language, let's model the world, where all the ‘observers’ cannot 
‘observe’ electromagnetic waves in the visible spectrum. According to the Vipul 
Arora and Laxmidhar Behera's logic (Arora & Behera, 2018, pp. 250-251) classical 
mechanics could not able to be created in this world. Because of the inability to 
see the movement of objects, we could not create a theoretical notion of 
mechanical motion as a change in the spatial position of an object over a certain 
time. Although hearing and tactile sensations can partially replace vision in this 
matter, the theoretical mechanics based on them would be completely different. 
Moreover, according to these scientists' logic, reality would lose some of its basic 
properties, because the necessary ‘observations’ would be absent. This conclusion 
arises from their reasoning. And then it remains to take only one step to come to 
the position of absolute subjectivism or solipsism. We are sure that this is not the 
goal of these scientists. However, willy-nilly, they again updated the old famous 
philosophical question: do roses smell if nobody sniffs them?  
Modern science has a vivid example of what happens to the cognitive abilities 
of a particular person if one or several feelings are not available to him from birth. 
We mean lots of facts of people, who are suffered by Usher syndrome since birth, 
i.e. who are blind and deaf. The best known in the USSR and Russia person, 
who was suffered by Usher syndrome, was Olga Skorokhodova (another woman 
with a similar fate, Helen Adams Keller, is more known in the USA and Europe). 
She wrote several books about how she imagines the world around her. She said: 
‘Many people have asked me whether I have any idea of colours. Some people 
have even asked me whether I can feel different colours. My reply to both these 
questions is ‘Of course not’’ (Skorokhodova, 1974, p. 13). She also said about 
phenomena which she could not able to imagine: ‘I am constantly obliged to use 
the language of people who can see and hear, for there is no separate language 
for the blind and the deaf ’ (Skorokhodova, 1974, p. 14). According to her idea, 
the primary qualities of objects are not depended on their perception. Objects 
have not any ‘colours’ for blind people, but objects still have the property of 
electromagnetic radiation. Also, all chemical reactions occur without smelling, 
sound waves spread without hearing, etc. That is, the removal of an observer's 
ability to perceive the world around him does not remove from the world any 
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primary properties (although it seems quite interesting question how physical 
science could be organized in the world of blind or deaf ‘observers’). Thus, 
removing any of human senses from the model of the world leads to the 
impossibility of the existence of the whole model but not of the whole world. 
Another point of view on this problem is developed in several scientific and 
philosophical theories, according to which there is a joint development of the 
Universe and man as its observer. One such idea is the ‘Participatory Anthropic 
Principle’ (PAP), a version of a Strong Anthropic Principle. We will discuss it 
below. For this section, more relevant is the discussion of modern ideas about the 
quantum nature of consciousness. Henry Stapp, an American mathematical 
physicist, is developing one of these concepts. We have no purpose to fully analyze 
all his ideas. Focus only on one, important for our paper. Unlike the prevailing 
opinion about the fundamental incomprehensibility of quantum mechanics for 
our mind, he writes that ‘Yet in the final analysis quantum mechanics is more 
understandable than classical mechanics because it is more deeply in line with 
our common sense ideas about our role in nature than the ‘automaton’ notion 
promulgated by classical physics’ (Stapp, 2011, p. 7). To a certain extent, Stapp’s 
idea that ‘The observer does not create what is not potentially there, but does 
participate in the extraction from the mass of existing potentialities individual 
items that have interest and meaning to the perceiving self ’ (Stapp, 2011, p. 8) 
Skorokhodova’s thought continues. Thus the sense organ and human 
consciousness do not create objects or their properties. They make it possible for 
them to exist in one specific state, which occurs after the collapse of the wave 
function. ‘The collapse events in conventional quantum physics are, in fact, 
psychophysical: each one has both a psychologically described aspect, 
corresponding to an increase in knowledge, and also an associated reduction of 
the (physically described) wave packet (quantum state) to one compatible with the 
gain in knowledge’ (Stapp, 2011, p. 122). 
However, we can imagine a model of the interaction of the universe and the 
human mind in a different way. What if the senses act in the opposite direction 
and information from the outside world forces our consciousness (in the case of a 
quantum nature) to ‘collapse’ to one state? In other words, the Universe does not 
need us so that, thanks to our observations, it exists in a certain state. But we need 
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the Universe so that our consciousness, our mind can exist. Something similar we 
can find, for example, in the Matthew P. A. Fisher's works. He explores the 
phenomenon of quantum entanglement between neurons, which occurs as a 
result of physicochemical processes in our nervous system. When the information 
supplied by our senses from the outside world is ‘translated’ into the ‘language’ of 
chemical reactions that is understandable to our nervous system, a correlation 
occurs between different neurons. This can be interpreted as the quantum effect 
of the collapse of the wave function of our consciousness and its reduction to one 
state. 
‘The phosphorus nuclear spins in phosphate ions serve as qubits, pairwise 
entangled during hydrolysis of pyrophosphate, engulfed and protected inside 
Posner molecules, inducing entanglement of the nuclear spins and rotational states 
of multiple Posner molecules, which can be transported into presynaptic 
glutamatergic neurons during vesicle endocytosis, with intra-cellular calcium being 
released by subsequent binding and melting of the Posner molecules, stimulating 
further glutamate release, thereby enhancing, and quantum-entangling, 
postsynaptic neuron excitability and activity!’ (Fisher, 2015, p. 600). 
Similar problems arise when we talk about the essence of the technical 
detectors. The most important question for this discussion is ‘theoretical 
conditionality’ of any technical detectors. Vipul Arora and Laxmidhar Behera 
described experiments with electron and concluded that ‘Instead of assuming an 
absolute entity called electron and trying to formulate an absolute picture of it, 
we can talk in terms of a relational entity related to different detectors in 
characteristic ways’ (Arora & Behera, 2018, p. 255). But any detector is a device, 
which was made by a human. It is meant that any detector is determined by 
scientific theory (or by primitive technical practice if we talk about society 
without science). If we use ‘detector A’ for experiment with the subject we get 
‘result A’. If we use ‘detector B’, which bases on another theory, we get ‘result B’. 
Both results give us different information about the object, and that situation can 
lead to a different understanding of the essence of the object. Niels Bohr wrote of 
this paradox:  
‘Within the scope of classical physics, all characteristic properties of a given object 
can in principle be ascertained by a single experimental arrangement, although in 
practice various arrangements are often convenient for the study of different aspects 
of the phenomena. In fact, data obtained in such a way simply supplement each 
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other and can be combined into a consistent picture of the behaviour of the object 
under investigation. In quantum mechanics, however, evidence about atomic 
objects obtained by different experimental arrangements exhibits a novel kind of 
complementary relationship. Indeed, it must be recognized that such evidence 
which appears contradictory when combination into a single picture is attempted, 
exhaust all conceivable knowledge about the object. Far from restricting our efforts 
to put questions to nature in the form of experiments, the notion 
of complementarity simply characterizes the answers we can receive by such 
inquiry, whenever the interaction between the measuring instruments and the 
objects form an integral part of the phenomena’ (Bohr, 1963, p. 4). 
We quoted such a large fragment of Bohr's article since this idea plays an 
important role in the structure of non-classical scientific rationality. We can affirm 
the dependence of the measurement results on the selected device and, 
accordingly, on the chosen theory. The theory, in turn, depends on the scientific 
paradigm, which tends to change during periods of scientific revolutions (Kuhn, 
1996, p. 111). Therefore, we should recognize the Vipul Arora and Laxmidhar 
Behera's idea about ‘modelling relationships amongst observations, without 
imposing any assumptions on the nature of underlying reality’ (Arora & Behera, 
2018, p. 248), as very difficult to implement.  
III. THE ONTOLOGICAL POSITION OF OBSERVER. 
Developing their ideas, Vipul Arora and Laxmidhar Behera use as synonyms 
such concepts as ‘world’ and ‘reality’. But this is unacceptable if we are on the 
philosophical point of view. Authors are in captivity of ‘pre-conceived notions’, 
although they write in the article about the necessity of the avoiding of that (Arora 
& Behera, 2018, p. 256). We should divide the semantic meaning of these notions. 
We suppose that the notion ‘world’ in the context of our discussion means 
external and independent of the observer thing. ‘World’ can exist without any 
observer. If tomorrow all people cease to exist, ‘world’ will continue to exist. In 
its turn, the English word ‘reality’ is connected with the verb ‘to realize’, which 
denotes the activity of our consciousness and thinking. Therefore, we can only 
talk about the connection of observations with ‘reality’, but not with the ‘world’. 
The reality, like a result of the interaction between our consciousness and the 
external world, depends on both the observations and the primal properties of 
objects. In this case, it is possible to speak of observations as building blocks of 
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reality.  
We have already mentioned that there are several scientific and philosophical 
theories, which pay lots of attention to the role of observer. For example, 
according to John Wheeler's idea, it follows that “observers are necessary to bring 
the Universe into being” (Wheeler, 1977, p. 27). This point of view, very flattering 
for mankind, is well correlated with the position of the authors under discussion. 
Participation of the observer in bringing the Universe into the state of existence 
implies a special ontological status of observations. We do not aim to discuss the 
problem of the observer in terms of quantum physics or cosmology deeply. 
However, the problem of the ontological position of the observer needs to the 
philosophical conclusion. We will try to solve it in terms of speculative realism, 
which is one of the modern concepts of philosophy. The most important for our 
discussion thesis of the speculative realism was formulated by Quentin 
Meillassoux. He wrote:   
“We shall therefore maintain the following: all those aspects of the object that can 
be formulated in mathematical terms can be meaningfully conceived as properties 
of the object in itself. All those aspects of the object that can give rise to a 
mathematical thought (to a formula or to digitalization) rather than to a perception 
or sensation can be meaningfully turned into properties of the thing not only as it 
is with me, but also as it is without me” (Meillassoux, 2008, p. 10). 
In this sense, it turns out that "mathematics" is the fundamental basis for the 
existence of objects, since it can exist without "mathematicians" or observers, in 
the context of our conversation. We are not talking about the Pythagorean 
ontologization of numbers or hypostasis of intangible objects. The ability to be 
expressed in the language of mathematics is equivalent to the ability to exist. 
Therefore, quantum phenomena that can be expressed in the language of 
mathematics (even without the fact of this expression) exist and can be 
understood by our mind. That strong thesis gives us an initial basis for combining 
the efforts of philosophy and science in solving the problem of the observer. The 
Kantian tradition in philosophy studies in a special way the relationships between 
the subject of cognitive activity and the external world. We can describe this 
special way as a ‘correlationism’. “By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to 
which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, 
and never to either term considered apart from the other” (Meillassoux, 2008, p. 
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13). So, if we tell about the abstracting of physical quantities from the sensations 
of our sense organs, we follow the path of correlationism. In this case, we can't 
affirm that the observations can be building blocks of the world or at least reality. 
Numerous facts of deception of feelings, limits of subjective cognitive activity, etc., 
which had been well known since the Antiquity, will not allow us to do this. 
However, the special parts of mathematics give us lots of new opportunities to 
explore the objective qualities of the external world. Therefore, we categorically 
welcome the Vipul Arora and Laxmidhar Behera's attempts to build “a 
mathematical framework of relational properties” (Arora & Behera, 2018, p. 257). 
Next, when we talk about something that wasn't and couldn't be directly 
observed, we must take the observer's role in studying this phenomenon 
differently. For example, when science tries to describe the initial stage of the 
development of our planet, it faces certain difficulties. 
“Since we do not know of any observer who was there to experience the accretion 
of the earth - and since we do not even see how a living observer would have been 
able to survive had she experienced such heat - all that can be formulated about 
such an event is what the ‘measurements’, that is to say, the mathematical data, 
allow us to determine: for instance, that it began roughly 4.56 billion years ago, that 
it did not occur in a single instant but took place over millions of years - more 
precisely, tens of millions of years - that it occupied a certain volume in space, a 
volume which varied through time, etc.” (Meillassoux, 2008, p. 24). 
Quantum phenomena can be even less accessible for our observation than 
the example given above. We can describe them with the Schrödinger wave 
function, but its real physical meaning eludes the ordinary consciousness of a 
human. And if indeed an observer is necessary for the existence of the Universe, 
according to Wheeler's conjecture, therefore it is necessary to rethink our 
understanding of the essence of the observer. We are used to the fact that the 
observer is always anthropomorphic, has a human mind and will. It is this 
observer that is necessary to create a science that will study nature based on 
observations. But is such an observer really necessary to create the Universe? 
Such an observer may be either God, the statements of which in this case we 
would like to avoid, or the self-observing Universe. There is one question, which 
solution is out of the goal of this paper, about the ontological nature of artificial 
intelligence as an observer. We also can develop our thought about the ‘natural’ 
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detector as an integral part of the natural object, which has not a nervous system. 
As a result, we come to the provocative idea that observations can exist without 
any observers in the traditional sense. In other words, the ability of an object to 
perceive information from another object makes it a kind of ‘observer’. In this 
case, one can try to create a scientific theory that considers the relationship 
between ‘observations’ as the information basis of the world. This observer is the 
part of the observable in the ontological sense. With the help of this assumption, 
a certain logical contradiction, which arose in the study of quantum phenomena, 
is eliminated. Now we don't need to formulate statements about quantum reality 
that are fundamentally impossible in terms of common-sense experience. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
There is a successful example of the observer problem solution. Since science 
created useful methods for determining the absolute age of rocks and objects, in 
general, we have got an opportunity of the revision of the philosophical problem 
of the observer in the field of geology. We have got the tool for making the 
independent measuring scale of the geological processes. With all the 
shortcomings of the methods of radioactive analysis, now we have a workable 
model of geological stratification. Thus, it was possible to solve the problem also 
related to the ontological status of the observer. Scientific statements on the 
problem of ‘ancestrality’ (in the terms of the speculative realism) received a new 
logical and epistemological status. Methods of radioactive analysis are the link 
between the descriptive part of geology and mathematical discourse. This 
discourse in its turn is characterized by “mathematics' ability to discourse about 
the great outdoors; to discourse about a past where both humanity and life are 
absent” (Meillassoux, 2008, p. 47). But the method of radioactive chronology is 
inherently connected with the solution of some problems in the field of quantum 
mechanics. Therefore, the solution to this problem will allow success in several 
branches of science. From ourselves, we can add those mathematics can reason 
not only about the past, where there was not a human observer but also about 
quantum processes where a human observer can't be in principle. We hope that 
the Vipul Arora and Laxmidhar Behera's efforts to study the problems that have 
been discussed above will be successful and allow us to form a new view of nature. 
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